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Fenk: Are Overriding Royalty Interests Becoming the Clay Pigeons of the

ARE OVERRIDING ROYALTY INTERESTS
BECOMING THE CLAY PIGEONS OF THE
TEXAS OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY? THE
ASSIGNOR-ASSIGNEE RELATIONSHIP AFTER
SASSER v. DANTEX OIL & GAS
INTRODUCTION

Consider the following scenario. Young Oil Company is a small oil
exploration company that has generated a drilling prospect.' Young

controls a block of leases around the prospect on which it hopes to get

a wildcat 2 well drilled. The company has exhausted most of its working capital on lease and geological outlays. Financially strapped,
Young is unable to afford the cost of drilling and will have to find
someone else to drill the well. Young decides to farmout 3 the pros-

pect; in return for a commitment from another company to drill a
well, Young will assign4 its leases to the other company, subject to a
reservation of a proportion of the oil and gas that may be produced.

This reserved proportion is an overriding royalty.' Young's marketing
is successful and it assigns the lease to Black-Gold Oil Company, with

the reservation of an overriding royalty of one-sixteenth of the working interest in the original leases. In the last year of the primary term6
of the lease, Black-Gold, the new lessee, permits the lease to terminate and then subsequently re-leases the property. The issue arises:
1. A drillling prospect is a block of leases or a concept supported by a knowledge
of geology defining a geographic area where the discovery of an oil field is possible.
See HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS
TERMS 885 (9th ed. 1994).
2. A wildcat well is "[a]n exploratory well being drilled in unproven territory,
that is, in a horizon from which there is no [petroleum] production in the general
area." Id. at 1218.
3. Williams & Meyers describes a farmout agreement as follows:
A very common form of agreement between operators, whereby a lease
owner not desirous of drilling at the time agrees to assign the lease, or some
portion of it ... to another operator who is desirous of drilling the tract....
The primary characteristic of the farmout is the obligation of the assignee to
drill one or more wells on the assigned acreage as a prerequisite to completion of the transfer to him.
Id. at 389 (citations omitted).
4. An assignment is one of the standard conveyances of mineral interests by
which all or partial interest in an original lease.are conveyed to the participant in an
oil deal. See id. at 62.
5. For a discussion considering the nature of the overriding royalty interest, see
infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
6. A primary term is a contractually determined period of time during which an
oil and gas lease may remain operative even though there is no production of oil or
gas in paying quantities, provided drilling operations are commenced or rental payments are paid. See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 844.
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Will the override of Young Oil Company be imposed upon the new
lease negotiated by Black-Gold?
The answer in Texas appears to be no. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v.
Parkes7 is the leading Texas case on the relationship between an assignor-overriding royalty owner and an assignee-working interest'
owner in this context. In this case, the Texas Supreme Court was
called upon to determine the extent to which the owner of an overriding royalty interest could be protected against attempts by a lease operator 9 to extinguish the overriding royalty owner's nonoperating
interest.1" The Sunac Court examined the effect of a provision found
in the assignment creating the overriding royalty that purported to
extend the life of the override to lease renewals and extensions. The
judicial treatment given this issue by the Sunac Court, and by Texas
courts in a series of related cases following Sunac, leads ultimately to
the conclusion that Texas courts are (1) limiting the use of such provisions by narrowly interpreting the situations in which a subsequent
lease procured by an assignee will be treated as a renewal or extension
of the original lease, and (2) narrowly interpreting the circumstances
in which use of the assignment clause or a preexisting relationship between the parties will serve as an effective method of imposing a fiduciary obligation to protect the interests of overriding royalty owners
against washouts. 1
The most recent case to consider this issue is Sasser v. Dantex Oil &
Gas, Inc.1 2 In Sasser,the San Antonio Court of Appeals examined the
effect on Sasser's overriding royalty under a 1974 lease when the lessor and lessee entered into a new lease in 1990.13 Distinguishing
Sasser from previous Texas cases that considered this issue is the fact
that the lessee intentionally acted to terminate a productive lease so as
to extinguish the non-cost-bearing overriding royalty interest dependent upon the earlier lease. 4 Following the Sunac Court's approach
to this issue, the Sasser court held that the new lease had the effect of

7. 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1967).
8. The working interest, also known as the operating interest, provides "the exclusive right to exploit the minerals on the land." See WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra
note 1, at 1225.
9. A lease operator, the owner of the operating interest, "is burdened with the
cost of development and operationg [sic] of the property." See WILLIAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 1, at 746.
10. A nonoperating interest is "[a]n interest in production from a mineral property which does not share in operating rights, e.g.,.. an overridingroyalty [interest]."
Id. at 701.
11. For a discussion of the relevant issues, see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying
text.
12. 906 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
13. See id. at 601.
14. See id. at 607.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol5/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V5.I2.4

2

Fenk: Are Overriding Royalty Interests Becoming the Clay Pigeons of the

1999]

SASSER v. DANTEX OIL & GAS

terminating the old lease and of consequently extinguishing Sasser's

override.15
In reaching its decision, the San Antonio Court of Appeals effectively broadens the reach of Sunac to extend to situations in which the
lessee may intentionally terminate a lease, even a commercially pro-

ductive lease, and, in the process, extinguish an override owner's interest. Arguably, the broadening of Sunac by the Sasser court, which
is unsupported by the reasoning of Sunac itself, as well as by post-

Sunac decisions, may have far reaching and serious implications for
the Texas oil and gas industry.16

I.

BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

1.

A. Introduction
Overriding Royalty Interests

In oil and gas law, there are several types of royalty interests.17 One
such interest is the overriding royalty interest. In Texas, "[t]he term
'overriding royalty' has a well-defined meaning .... It is an interest
which is carved out of, and constitutes a part of, the working interest
created by an oil and gas lease."' 8 The lessee may retain such an
interest in himself if he assigns all or part of the lease, or he may
transfer such an interest as a means of providing compensation for
services. 19 Normally, Texas courts have held that "[a]n overriding roy15. See id.
16. See infra notes 121-25 and accompanying text.
17. See generally Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. 1937) ("The word[]
'royalty[ ]' . . . [has] a well-understood meaning in the oil and gas business ...
Broadly speaking, a reservation of minerals or mineral rights without limitation would
include royalties ...."); WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 1, at 970 (defining royalty
as a right that entitles the owner of the interest to a "share of production, free of
expenses of production").
18. Gruss v. Cummins, 329 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ
ref'd n.r.e). Martin and Kramer provide the following illustration:
Typically, . . .the term overriding royalty is used to describe a royalty
carved out of the working interest created by an oil and gas lease. Most
frequently it is created subsequent to a lease by grant or reservation. For
example, the original lessee may transfer the leasehold, or some part
thereof, retaining a 1/16 overriding royalty-an override created by reservation-or the lessee may transfer a 1/16 overriding royalty for a valuable consideration-an override created by grant. . . . Overriding royalties are
perhaps created more often by reservation than by grant. The usual occasion
for the reservation of an override is the transfer of a lease or a portion
thereof, the lessee-assignor retaining an interest in production from the assigned lease in the form of an overriding royalty ....
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS: OIL AND GAS
LAW § 418.1, at 351 (1997).
19. See 3 W.L. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 554, at 625-26 (2d ed.
1958). The reasons for such assignments are as varied as the types available. Overriding royalty interests are frequently used to compensate the geologist who developed
the prospect, the landman who took the lease, or others who performed service for
the Lessee and have helped to structure a drilling venture. See id. Also, "an overrid-
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alty interest, because it is carved out of a leasehold interest, is limited
in duration to the leasehold interest's life, and the termination of that
leasehold estate extinguishes the overriding royalty.""z This is the
case generally, unless "the instrument creating the overriding royalty

z
interest makes [an] express provision to the contrary."'

2.

Extension-Renewal Clause

A common form of protective clause used in the instruments creating an overriding royalty is an "extension or renewal" clause. The
clause, as a contract term, is a provision in a lease assignment that
extends the overriding royalty interest to renewals and extensions of
the original lease.22 An "extension or renewal" clause is commonly
included in an oil and gas lease assignment as an anti-washout provision designed to extend the overriding royalty interest to new leases
obtained on the same property by the same lessee. 23 A washout occurs when "[a]n operator ... intentionally terminate[s] the lease and

obtain[s] a new lease on24 the same property in order to destroy the
nonoperating interests.
ing royalty may be created by grant as consideration for.., the financing of drilling
operations." MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 18, § 418.1, at 351. "[L]ease assignments quite commonly occur in the context of a farmout agreement .... Typically an
oil company that has a lease... may transfer its interest.., to an operator who agrees
to drill a well to a specified depth and at a specified location on the acreage transferred." EUGENE 0. Kurz ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW 604 (2d ed. 1993).
20. In re GHR Energy Corp., 972 F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967)).
21. Keese v. Continental Pipe Line Co., 235 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1956).
22. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 16, § 428.1, at 468. The authors explain as
follows:
A common contractual provision for the protection of the owner of a nonoperating interest takes the form of an extension and renewal clause entitling
the owner of such interest to share in any extension or renewal of the lease
or other interest out of which the nonoperating interest has been carved or
reserved.
Id. See also EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 63.2
(1991) ("[T]he instrument by which the interest is created may provide that the overriding royalty will apply to modifications, renewals, and extensions of the lease."); cf.
Bruce A. Ney, ProtectingOverriding Royalty Interests in Oil and Gas Leases: Are the
Courts Moving to Washout Extension or Renewal Clauses? 31 WASHBURN L.J. 544,
549 (1992) (noting that the clause, to be effective, must appear in the instrument creating the overriding royalty interest).
23. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 18, § 428.1, at 469-70 & n.4 ("The purpose
of the extension-renewal clause is to prevent what is known as a "wash-out," that is,
the elimination of an override or other share of the working interest by the surrender
of the lease and subsequent reacquisition of a lease on the same land, free of such
interest.") (citation omitted). See also Otter Oil Co. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 834 F.2d
531, 533 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that purpose of extension and renewal clause was to
prevent washout).
24. Ney, supra note 22, at 546 (alterations in original) (quoting David E. Pierce,
An Analytical Approach To DraftingAssignments, 44 Sw. L.J. 943, 968 (1990)). Ney
goes on to explain as follows:
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Some commentators have observed that, "[t]heoretically, the overriding royalty interest should attach to any modifications, extensions,
or renewals occurring while the original lease is still effective regardless of whether the instrument contained an extension or renewal

clause."2 5 Under Texas law, however, this is clearly not the case. As
the Court in Sunac explained, unless the instrument creating the over-

riding royalty expressly provides to the contrary, "when an oil and gas
lease terminates, the overriding royalty created in an assignment of
the lease is likewise extinguished."26
Accepting, for the moment, that an express provision in an oil and
gas lease assignment that extends the overriding royalty to all renewals and extensions is, in principle, necessary for the interest to apply to

any renewals and extensions of the original lease, the next question to
consider is whether the inclusion of such a clause has, in practice, provided effective protection for overriding royalty interest owners
against attempts to extinguish their interest.
B.

The Current Status of the Law: The Sunac Two-Step Approach

The leading Texas case on the relationship between a lessee and an
overriding royalty interest owner in this context is Sunac. In Sunac,
and in post-Sunac decisions, a clear trend has been established that
Texas courts are moving to limit the utility of "renewal or extension"
provisions in oil and gas contracts by restricting the situations in which
the presence of a renewal or extension clause in the original lease will
cause an overriding royalty to attach to a subsequent lease. 7 Texas
courts since Sunac have narrowly interpreted the situations in which a
A washout of an overriding royalty interest may be accomplished in one of
two ways. The first method involves the operator's procurement of a top
lease prior to the expiration of the primary term of the bottom lease covering the same acreage. The second form of washout occurs through the termination of the existing lease and the subsequent execution of a new lease or
leases covering the same acreage.
Id. at 546-47 (citations omitted). See also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 18, § 420.2,
at 362 (explaining that a washout "concerns conduct of the operator designed to extinguish the nonoperating interest while preserving the operator's interest in the
premises").
25. Ney, supra note 22, at 549 (noting that "'[i]n such a situation the lease out of
which the interest was carved still exists and there is no reason why it should not
continue to be subject to the overriding royalty."') (quoting EUGENE Kurz, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 63.2 (1991)).
26. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967).
27. See id. at 803-04 (holding that a new lease was not a renewal and extension of
the original lease, and declining to impose a fiduciary relationship between the lessee
and the overriding royalty interest owner based on the renewal and extension clause
contained in the lease assignment). See generally Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas
Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (declining to impose fiduciary duty on lessee despite fact that assignment contained clause
providing that overriding royalty interest would apply to all renewals and extensions
of lease); McCormick v. Krueger, 593 S.W.2d 729, 729-30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (rejecting a claim that a new lease was a continuation
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subsequent lease will be treated as a renewal or extension of the original lease 28 and have consistently declined to impose a fiduciary rela29
tionship on the parties by reason of such a provision.
In Sunac, and in post-Sunac decisions involving lease assignments
extending the overriding royalty to all renewals and extensions, the
approach taken has been a two-step process: (1) to determine
whether the later lease was an "extension or renewal" of the prior
lease, or a "new" lease; and, (2) if determined to be a "new" lease,
then to consider whether that lease should be treated as an extension
or renewal of the original lease under a constructive trust theory, such
that the overriding royalty interest continued.
1. Extension or Renewal, or New Lease
Perhaps the most formidable obstacle to attempts in Texas courts to
protect overriding royalty interests through the use of extension or
renewal clauses has been the trend-established in Sunac, and followed in post-Sunac decisions-to narrowly construe the terms "extension" and "renewal" to find that a subsequent lease is not an
extension or renewal of the former lease, but is instead a "new" lease,
free of the burden of the overriding royalty reserved under the old
lease.
In Sunac, the Texas Supreme Court considered whether the inclusion of an extension or renewal provision in an oil and gas lease assignment that reserved an overriding royalty interest for the assignor
caused the override to attach to a subsequent lease. 3' The assignment
that reserved the overriding royalty in the assignor contained a provision imposing the overriding royalty on "production from the lease, or
from any extension or renewal thereof."31 After questions arose regarding the termination of the original lease, the lease operator and
lessor executed a second lease but failed to provide for the existing
overriding royalty interest.32 The defendant/assignee argued that the
override had not attached to the subsequent lease. He maintained
that the first lease containing the overriding royalty reservation had
terminated under its own terms and that the second lease was not an
extension or renewal of the original lease.3" The Court agreed, holding that the second lease was not an extension or renewal of the original lease.34

Several factors were relied upon in reaching this

conclusion.
of a former lease despite language extending the overriding royalty to all renewals

and extensions).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
infra notes 53-63, 79 and accompanying text.
Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 799.
id.
id. at 800.
id. at 799.
id. at 803.
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The Court first considered whether the original lease was still in
effect so as to preserve the overriding royalty interest under the specific terms contained in the assignment of the lease. Finding that there
was neither production from, nor operations upon, the lease acreage
to extend the lease beyond its primary term, the Sunac Court held that
the initial lease in question terminated under its own provisions at the
time the primary term of the lease ended.35
The Court next considered whether the second lease was a new
lease and thus not subject to the provisions of the assignment in the
expired lease, or conversely, whether the extension or renewal of the
earlier lease, by virtue of the extension or renewal clause in the original lease assignment, bound the lessee to honor the assignor's overriding royalty interest.36 The Court construed the terms "extension" and
"renewal" and held that the second lease was not an extension or renewal of the first lease, but a "new" lease instead. In reaching its decision, the Court first examined
whether the new lease was an
"extension" of the old lease. 37 The Sunac Court, finding that an option for extension contemplates a continuance of an old lease for a
further period, held that the second lease did not constitute an extension of the old lease since the second lease was not a "prolongation or
continuation of the term of the existing lease."38 The Court next analyzed whether the second lease might be considered as a "renewal" of
the first lease.3 9 Finding that an option for renewal implies the giving
of a new lease upon the same terms as the old lease, the Court held
that the second lease was not a renewal of the original, because (1) the
second lease was entered into after the original lease had long since
expired, 40 and (2) the operator obtained the second lease on terms
35.
36.
37.
38.

See id. at 802.
See id.
See id.
Id. (citing Mutual Paper Co. v. Hoague-Sprague Corp., 8 N.E.2d 802 (Mass.

1937)).
39. See id.
40. See id. (finding that the second lease was not acquired until at least a year after
the old lease had expired). The question naturally arises, how much-or conversely,
how little-time is sufficient before Texas courts conclude that a second lease will no
longer be considered a renewal of the original? In support of its decision, the Sunac
Court cites Thomas v. Warner-Quinlan, 65 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland

1933, writ ref'd). See id. at 805. In Thomas, the assignor of oil and gas leases contended that a new lease taken by the assignee on the same land thirty-one days after
the old lease had expired was in legal effect a renewal of the former lease, entitling
the assignor to an overriding royalty interest in the current lease. See Thomas, 65
S.W.2d at 322-23. The terms of the contract of assignment extended the overriding
royalty to all renewals and extensions. See id. at 321-22. Despite this language, the
Thomas Court refused the assignor any relief holding, in part, that the assignee, "was
under no duty to procure any renewal or extension of the first lease," even though,
under the terms of the assignment, "had it done so, same would have enured to the
benefit of the [assignor]." Id. at 325.
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substantially different from those of the original lease.41 Thus, having
determined that the original lease containing the assignment reserving
the overriding royalty interest had expired and that the subsequent
lease constituted a "new" lease, being neither an extension nor a renewal of the former lease so as to perpetuate the overriding royalty
interest, the Court held that the overriding royalty interest reserved in
the original lease also had expired.4 2
Since the Sunac decision, Texas courts have applied the reasoning of
Sunac and have consistently rejected claims that a subsequent lease
was a renewal or extension of a former lease, thereby binding the new
lessee to honor an overriding royalty interest. In Exploration Co. v.
Vega Oil & Gas Co.," the assignment creating the plaintiff's overriding royalty interest specifically provided that his overriding royalty
would continue in any renewals or extensions of the original leases.4 4
Citing Sunac, the court held that a new lease is not a "renewal or
extension" of an expired lease "if the new lease was entered into after
the old lease had already expired, new consideration exists to support
the new lease, the new lease was executed under different circumstances, and the new lease contains different terms."45 The plaintiff's
case met none of the criteria; therefore, the court concluded that the
new leases were not in renewal or extension of the expired leases.4 6
Similarly, in McCormick v. Krueger,47 the Houston First Court of
Appeals cited Sunac in rejecting a claim that a new lease was actually
a renewal and extension of a former lease despite language extending
the overriding royalty to all renewals and extensions and to new leases
taken on the same land within one year of the expiration of the existing lease.4 8 The McCormick Court held that the overriding royalty
41. See Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 802-03. Specifically, new consideration existed to
support the second lease; the later lease was executed under different circumstances,
and the later lease contained different terms. See id.
42. See id. at 802-04.
43. 843 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
44. See id. at 124. The assignment included the following clause: "The overriding
royalty interest herein reserved shall be binding upon and encumber all extensions
and renewals of any of said leases hereafter secured by assignee, its successors or
assigns." Id. When the original leases expired by nonproduction, the defendant acquired new oil and gas leases covering the same minerals as the old leases. See id.
The plaintiff argued that the new oil and gas leases were actually a renewal and extension of the prior lease, and thereby covered by the assignment's language, entitling
the plaintiff to an overriding royalty interest to be paid from the production from the
current leases. See id. at 125. The court found that the original leases had terminated
for lack of production in paying quantities, that the new leases were acquired more
than a year after the old leases had expired, and that the new leases contained differ-

ent terms from the original leases. See id. at 125-26

45. Exploration Co., 843 S.W.2d at 125-26 (citing Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 803).

46. See id. at 126.

47. 593 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id. at 729-30 (noting that the plaintiff reserved an overriding royalty interest
"under and by virtue of the assigned leases or any extension thereof" and stipulated
that the overriding royalty interest would extend to "all renewals and extensions of
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had been extinguished with the expiration of the prior lease and that
the current lessee was not obligated to honor the overriding royalty
interest reserved under the subsequent lease agreement.49
Therefore, even though an oil and gas assignment may expressly
provide that subsequent lease extensions and renewals are subject to
an overriding royalty, Texas courts since Sunac have limited the use of
such provisions by narrowly interpreting the situations in which a subsequent lease procured by an assignee will be treated as a renewal or
extension of the original lease. If the second lease was made after the
expiration of the original lease and contains substantially different
terms from the original lease, Texas courts will not give effect to an
extension or renewal clause. In these situations, the second lease will
be deemed a new lease, unburdened by the overriding royalty reserved under the original lease, not an extension or renewal of the
original lease.
Confidential or Fiduciary Relations
If a subsequent lease has first been determined to be a new lease
and not an extension or renewal of an earlier lease, the second step of
the approach established in Sunac is to consider whether the assignment of the oil and gas lease reserving the overriding royalty interest
created any confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor
and his assignee.: ° In Texas, "[i]t is ... generally held that the assignment of an oil and gas lease reserving an overriding royalty in the
assignor does not usually create any confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and his assignee." 51 If such a relationship is
created, however, a second lease may be treated as an extension or
renewal of an original lease under a constructive trust theory so as to
maintain the assignor's overriding royalty rights. 2 Acknowledging
that other jurisdictions had so held,53 the Texas Supreme Court in
Sunac recognized two underlying principles for these holdings:
2.

said leases or to any new lease taken on any of the lands covered by said leases within

one (1) year of the expiration or termination of the applicable lease").
49. See id. at 731.
50. See Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 803-05 (Tex. 1967).

51. Id. at 804.
52. See id. at 803. The Court observed, "A constructive trust arises where there is
a fiduciary or confidential relationship between two or more parties and the party
holding certain property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched if he were
allowed to keep the property." Id. at 804 (citing Omohundro v. Matthews, 341
S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1960)).
53. See id. at 803-04 (citing Probst v. Hughes, 286 P. 875 (Okla. 1930) and Howell
v. Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 271 P.2d 271 (Kan. 1954) as examples where a second lease
was treated as a renewal or extension of an original lease because the terms of the
conveyance imposed upon the assignee the duty of protecting the interests of the
assignor). See generally Ney, supra note 22, at 564-67 (examining the effectiveness of
extension or renewal clauses in oil and gas lease assignments as the basis for imposing
heightened or fiduciary obligations on the relationship between the assignor and

assignee).
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"either (1) specific language in the assignment or (2) the close relationship between the parties shown by the particular facts involved."54
a.

Specific Language in the Assignment

In Sunac, the Texas Supreme Court noted that "[t]he language most
often pointed to by the courts as creating a fiduciary relation in this
type of situation provides that the overriding royalty will apply to any
extensions or renewals of the lease assigned."55 The assignment in
Sunac that created the overriding royalty used such "phraseology." 56
However, in addition to the express inclusion in the lease assignment
of a renewal or extension provision, the assignment also contained
language-a "duty to develop and surrender" provision-that expressly relieved the assignee of any duty to develop the lease and allowed the assignee to surrender the lease at its option, without the
overriding royalty owner's consent.57 Construing the two provisions
together, the Sunac Court declined to impose a fiduciary relationship
between the lessee and the overriding royalty interest owner based on
the renewal and extension clause contained in the assignment.58 The
Court remarked that it was the inclusion of the "duty to develop and
surrender" provision that materially distinguished the case at bar from
54. Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 803.
55. Id. at 804. As one commentator has expressed it, the clause may be used "indirectly" as a method to protect the interests of overriding royalty owners through the
imposition of fiduciary obligations:
In addition to the direct effect of an extension or renewal clause as a con-

tract term, the clause has been found to have an indirect effect. Some courts
have held that the inclusion of an extension or renewal clause supports the
imposition of heightened or fiduciary obligations on the relationship between the operator of a lease and the overriding royalty owner.
To allow the owners of overriding royalty interests to take advantage of
this indirect effect, the inclusion of extension or renewal clauses in lease
transfer agreements or assignments which create an overriding royalty interest has been encouraged as a means of providing the court with evidence of
the parties' intent to form a fiduciary relationship. A court, finding that the
protective clause created a fiduciary relationship between the operator and
overriding royalty interest owner, may impress the overriding royalty on the
post-washout lease through the imposition of a constructive trust.
Ney, supra note 22, at 550 (citations omitted).
56. See Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 804. "The assignment provided, 'Assignor hereby
reserves unto himself, his successors, heirs and assigns as a perpetual overriding royalty . . .1/16 of 7/8 of all the oil, gas and/or casinghead gas, if, only, as and when
produced, saved and sold from the premises covered by this lease, or any extensions
or renewals thereof . . . .'" Id. at 806 n.1 (alteration in original).
57. See id. at 804. The court noted that the assignment contained the following
provision that expressly relieved the assignee of any duty to develop the lease:
There shall be no obligation, express or implied, on the part of Assignee, its
successors or assigns, to keep said lease in force by payment of rentals or
drilling or development operations, and Assignee shall have the right to surrender all or any part of such leased acreage without the consent of
Assignor.
Id.
58. See id.
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cases relied upon by the plaintiff-assignor-cases that held that the
express inclusion of an extension or renewal clause in a lease assignment was sufficient to impose a fiduciary obligation upon the assignee
to protect the assignor's interest.59
Although the Texas Supreme Court in its Sunac opinion seemingly
took a "four corners" approach60 to support its conclusion that the
specific language of the lease assignment was insufficient to impose
fiduciary responsibilities upon the parties, it is not clear whether the
Court gave preemptive weight to the "duty to develop and surrender"
clause in reaching its decision. Thus, the Sunac Court leaves unanswered the question of whether the express inclusion of an extension
or renewal clause in a lease .assignment-in the absence of competing
contractual provisions-is sufficient to impose fiduciary obligations
upon the operator-assignee., The Court's decision does suggest, however, that the effect of the renewal or extension clause should at least
be weighed and balanced, if not preempted, by countervailing provisions in the assignment.
In Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co.,61 a recent post-Sunac
decision, the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals also had
occasion to consider the effect of using an extension or renewal clause
to protect an assignor's overriding royalty interest through the imposition of a constructive trust. In Exploration Co., the plaintiff-assignor
sought to impress a constructive trust in his favor on new leases taken
by the defendant-assignee, arguing that the renewal and extension
clause contained in the original lease assignment automatically created a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.62
Unlike the assignment in Sunac, the lease assignment in Exploration
Co. lacked any language negating the lessee's obligation to keep the
lease in effect and contained no provisions abrogating a fiduciary
duty.63 Citing Sunac, the Exploration Co. Court observed that the

presence of the "duty to develop and surrender" provision in the
Sunac case was not material to the Texas Supreme Court's decision,
but rather, that the Sunac Court's decision was merely "strengthened"
by the inclusion of such language.64 As a result, the court found that
"[mlerely because this language is not in the lease in this case does not
mean that a fiduciary relationship exists." 65 On this basis, the Hous59. Id.
60. See Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of InterpretingMineral Deeds and
Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 66
(1993) (explaining that use of the canon allows courts to consider the language of the
entire reservation in order to ascertain the intent of the parties and the meaning of

the reservation).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

843
See
See
See
Id.

S.W.2d 123 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
id. at 126.
id.
id.
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ton Court of Appeals held that a constructive trust should not be imposed, thereby
requiring the recognition of the overriding royalty
66
interest.
Arguably, the decision in Exploration Co. gave an overly broad
reading to the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Sunac on this
issue. While Sunac suggests that the effect of the renewal or extension clause to impose a fiduciary obligation on the assignee may be
negated by countervailing provisions in the assignment, the Houston
Court of Appeals' decision concludes that use of the clause will not
create a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor
and assignee even in situations where countervailing language in the
assignment to negate the alleged fiduciary obligation is absent.
Thus, in considering whether the inclusion of an extension or renewal clause in the instrument creating the overriding royalty creates
any confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and his
assignee, Texas courts conclude that the use of the clause does not
serve as an effective method of imposing a fiduciary obligation. At its
most potent, the presence of the clause carries little weight against
countervailing language that would negate the alleged fiduciary obligation. At its least potent, no such obligation exists, even in the absence of countervailing provisions.
b. Special Relationship Between the Parties
Evidence of a close or special relationship between the assignor and
assignee, sufficient to create a fiduciary obligation apart from any express agreement to that effect, is the second basis under the Sunac
decision to support a claim that a constructive trust should be67 imposed
requiring the recognition of the overriding royalty interest.
Having found no express language in the instrument creating the
overriding royalty sufficient to support the imposition of fiduciary obligations between the operator of a lease and the overriding royalty
owner, the court considered whether a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between the parties to that instrument sufficient to
give rise to a constructive trust. 68 The Court observed that "a constructive trust arises where there is a fiduciary or confidential relationship between two or more parties and the party holding certain
property would profit by a wrong or be unjustly enriched if he were
allowed to keep the property. '69 The Sunac Court, failing to find that
any such relationship existed between the parties, declined to justify a
constructive trust in the overriding royalty owner's favor. 70 The justification for the majority opinion was twofold: (1) the general rule that
66. See id. at 127.
67. See Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1967).

68. See id. at 804.
69. Id. at 804 (citing Omohundro v. Matthews, 341 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1960)).

70. See id. at 805.
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the mere assignment of an oil and gas lease reserving an overriding
royalty interest does not in itself create a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and assignee, and (2) the particular
facts involved in this case did not indicate any "basis for a holding that
there existed a confidential or fiduciary relationship."'"
Three justices on the Sunac Court dissented on this issue, arguing
that the second lease was an extension or renewal of the original
lease.72 The dissent contended that a fiduciary relationship was created between the assignor and the assignee "by reason of the peculiar
circumstances existing at the time the new lease was taken."73 The
facts in the majority opinion indicated, in a perfunctory manner, that
the new lease was taken only after the successors of the original lessor
raised a question as to the validity of the original lease.74 In contrast,
the dissent's account of the facts called attention to the underlying
implication that the lessors and lessees chose not to have a court determine the validity of the original lease but, instead, settled their differences by entering into a new lease to replace the questionable
lease. 75 The dissent argued that, regardless of any preexisting confidential relationship between the parties or the presence of any extension or renewal language in the assignment, these particular facts were
in themselves sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship between
Sunac, the lessee, and Parkes, the overriding royalty interest owner.7 6
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Hamilton seemingly admonishes
the court for perfunctorily dismissing the notion that no special, confidential or fiduciary relationship was involved, saying:
When the question of invalidity of the lease was raised by the lessors to Sunac, Parkes' rights were involved just as were Sunac's. If
Sunac had stood its ground and suffered a lawsuit, Parkes would
have been an indispensable party defendant. Parkes had just as
much right to settle with the lessors as did Sunac, but Parkes had no
opportunity to settle. Sunac went behind his back and sold him out
This sort
by taking a new lease and thereby releasing the old 7one.
7
of conduct should not be allowed to cut Parkes out.
The argument advanced by the Sunac dissent raises a significant issue: in considering whether to impose a constructive trust, when and
under what circumstances will the Texas courts recognize a fiduciary
relationship? Six years later, in Consolidated Gas & Equipment Co. v.
Thompson,78 the Texas Supreme Court clarified its position on the issue. The Thompson Court held that for a constructive trust to arise,
71. Id. at 804-05.
72. See id. at 811 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. See Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 800.

75. See id. at 806 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 811.
77. Id.

78. 405 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1966).
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the evidence must establish "a fiduciary relationship before, and apart
from, the agreement made the basis of the suit."7 9 Further, the Court
recognized that "a fiduciary relationship could arise ... when, over a
long period of time, the parties had worked together for the joint acquisition and development of property previous to the particular
agreement sought to be enforced." 80 This statement appears to foreclose the possibility that the heightened relationship could be based
upon other grounds.
One post-Sunac court has had occasion to consider the Thompson
Court's basis for recognition of a fiduciary relationship. In addressing
a claim that a constructive trust should be imposed requiring the recognition of an overriding royalty interest apart from any express
agreement to that effect, the Houston Court of Appeals followed the
two-step approach established in Sunac but applied the Thompson
Court's grounds for determining whether a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. 81 The court found no evidence of such a
relationship on this basis and refused to impose a constructive trust.8 2
Thus, in considering the scope of circumstances in which evidence
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship is effective to support a
claim that a constructive trust should be imposed, the conclusion
reached is that Texas courts are moving to limit those occasions in
which a constructive trust will be found. In holding that evidence of
any confidential or personal relationship between the parties could
give rise to fiduciary responsibilities, the Texas Supreme Court in
Sunac proscribed a rather broad test for determining when a constructive trust may be imposed. The Court's later decision in Thompson,
however, significantly limited those circumstances under which a
Texas court may impose a constructive trust: (1) by narrowly construing the type of relationships that will give rise to fiduciary obligations,
and (2) by requiring that the fiduciary relationship be shown to have
been in existence before, and apart from, the particular agreement
sought to be enforced.

II. SASSER

v. DANTEX OIL

& GAS, INC.

Sasser v. Dantex Oil & Gas, Inc. 3 is the most recent of the short
line of cases to consider the Sunac Court's approach to determine
whether the owner of an overriding royalty interest was entitled to
79. Id. at 336.
80. Id. at 336-37 (noting that these relationships were exceptions arising apart
from the typical cases of fiduciary relationship, such as attorney-client, partners, close
family relationships, and joint adventurers).
81. See Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 126 (Tex. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
82. See id. at 127.
83. 906 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ).
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relief when confronted with an attempt by the lessee to eliminate or
"washout" the interest.
A.

The Facts of the Case

In Sasser, Dantex entered into an oil and gas lease in 1974 subject to
an overriding royalty interest owned by Sasser.8 4 The lease was maintained beyond its primary term by production from wells on the property, but by 1990, continuation of the lease became questionable.85
Declining production raised concerns that the 1974 lease had expired
because of the possibility that production was no longer in paying
quantities.86 Dantex attempted to ratify the 1974 lease, but the landowner, Newsom, refused.87 Newsom wanted both a larger royalty and
a commitment that Dantex would drill a horizontal well to increase
production.88 Dantex agreed to Newsom's terms, and in 1990, a new
lease was signed and several successful horizontal wells were drilled.89
When Dantex refused to pay Sasser the overriding royalty from well
production established under the 1990 oil and gas lease, Sasser alleged
that the overriding royalty interest applicable to the 1974 lease continued to burden the subsequent 1990 lease.9" He sued for a declaratory
judgment, an accounting, and a money judgment for the royalties alleged to be due. 9 Alternatively he sought damages, alleging that by
entering into the 1990 lease, Dantex breached its duty of good faith
and fair dealing. Sasser argued that "'evolving principles of Texas
law' mandate[d] the conclusion that an oil and gas lessee owes an
overriding royalty interest owner a duty of good faith not to engage in
to eliminate or 'washout' the overriding royintentional acts designed
92
alty interest owner."
The Holding of the Case
A summary judgment against Sasser was affirmed on appeal. 93
Finding that Dantex was not in a special or confidential relationship
with the overriding royalty interest owners under the initial lease, the
court held that Dantex owed Sasser no duty of good faith and fair
dealing or any other fiduciary-type duty. 94 Consequently, the parties
B.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 601.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

91. See id.
92. Id. at 605-06.
93. See id. at 608.
94. See id. at 606-07. The Sasser Court noted dicta in a recent Fifth Circuit opinion in which the court of appeals suggested that it "might impose a duty of good faith
and fair dealing 'if the facts ... suggested that [the lessee] surrendered its interest in
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were free to take any action that would extinguish the overriding royalty interest. The court considered whether the 1974 lease had terminated due to a lack of production in paying quantities.95 The court
found, however, that the fact was not material96 and asserted that the
release of the old lease with the consequent extinguishment of the
override would have been effective even "assum[ing] . . . that there

was production in paying quantities" under the old lease.9 7
C. The Sasser Court's Analysis

In reaching its decision, the San Antonio Court of Appeals applied
the two-step approach taken by the Texas Supreme Court in Sunac to
determine whether a constructive trust should be imposed to protect
the overriding royalty owner based upon "either (1) specific language
in the assignment or (2) the close relationship between the parties
shown by the particular facts involved." 98
First, the court considered whether Sasser's assignment to Dantex
contained the magic "phraseology" to impose the overriding royalty
on leases taken in renewal and extension. 99 The court found that the
1974 lease creating the reservation of Sasser's overriding royalty interest did not contain a contract term purporting to extend the overriding
royalty to any modifications, renewals, or extensions of the 1974
lease.100
Next, applying the Sunac approach, the Sasser Court addressed
whether a constructive trust should be imposed requiring the recognition of the overriding royalty interest. The court first considered
whether the inclusion of any express language in the assignment created any confidential or fiduciary relationship between Sasser and
Dantex such that Sasser's overriding royalty continued under the new
lease.'0° The court noted that not only did the specific language in the
assignment fail to contain an extension or renewal provision, but that
it did expressly include a clause that allowed Dantex to surrender the
lease at its option without Sasser's consent.10 2 Citing Sunac, the
Sasser Court observed that, under Texas law, inclusion of a unilateral
surrender provision in an instrument creating an override is sufficient
to negate an alleged fiduciary obligation created by an extension or
the lease to destroy the rights of the overriding royalty interest owner."' Id. at 607
(alteration in original) (citing In re GHR Energy Corp., 979 F.2d 40, 41 (5th Cir.
1992)).
95. See id. at 603-04.
96. See id. at 604.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 606 (quoting Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 803
(Tex. 1967)).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 606.
102. See id.
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renewal clause even if a protective clause is present. 0 3 On this basis,
the court declined to employ this ground to justify that the 1990 lease
should be treated as an extension or renewal of the 1974 lease.'0
The court then considered the Sunac Court's second ground to justify a constructive trust:' 0 5 "the close relationship between the parties
shown by the particular facts involved."'0 6 Sasser cited Manges v
Guerra10 7 to urge the court to extend the fiduciary duty imposed upon
an executive to a lessee in Dantex's position.'0 8 However, the Sasser
Court declined to follow Manges and, instead, followed the reasoning
in Sunac by reasserting the general rule that the mere assignment of
an oil and gas lease reserving an overriding royalty interest does not in
itself create a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the assignor and assignee.' 0 9 The court, agreeing with the trial court, held
that the relationship between Dantex and Sasser was a purely business
relationship and that no evidence of a close or special relationship
existed sufficient to create a fiduciary obligation that would suggest an
exception to the general rule." 0
Finally, the court considered Sasser's claim of bad faith on the part
of Dantex. Sasser attempted to distinguish Sunac, because in Sunac
the old lease terminated by its own terms, whereas in Sasser, Dantex
intentionally terminated the 1974 lease in order to enter into the 1990
lease."' Sasser asserted that Dantex's intentional act to terminate the
lease harmed him economically by extinguishing his interest in a productive lease." 2 In addition, Sasser argued that the San Antonio
Court of Appeals had previously "granted relief to an overriding royalty interest owner who was harmed by the intentional acts of a leasehold owner.""' 3 The court rejected this argument because it found
103. See id. at 606; cf. Exploration Co. v. Vega Oil & Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 123, 126
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (declining to impose fiduciary
duty on lessor even in absence of surrender clause).
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. (quoting Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex.
1967)).
107. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). Manges acquired the surface, 1h the minerals and
all the executive rights in a south Texas ranch from the Guerras. See id. at 181. Thus,
only Manges had the right to lease and the Guerras were dependent upon him to
lease their interest on reasonable terms. Finding that Manges encumbered the Guerras' interest in the property, leased the property to himself for a nominal sum and
engaged in other acts of self-dealing to the detriment of the Guerras, the Court held
that Manges' conduct amounted to a breach of his fiduciary duty. See id. at 184.
108. See Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 607.
109. See id. at 606-07.
110. See id. at 602, 607.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 601.
113. Id. at 607 (citing Cain v. Neumann, 316 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1958, no writ)). In Cain, a third party held an overriding royalty interest in a
lease that by its own terms would continue as long as "oil, gas, or other minerals can
be produced thereon." Cain, 316 S.W.2d at 918. The lessor and lessee purported to
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that Dantex's actions were contractually permitted and there was no
reason to deny Dantex of its contractual rights.114 It held that when
Dantex and Newsom signed the 1990 lease with the intent and understanding that doing so would effect the release of the 1974 lease, the
subsequent lease effectively terminated the initial lease, along with the
overriding royalty interest under that lease.11 5
D. The Sasser Decision in View of Post-Sunac Law
The Sasser case is clearly distinguishable from the post-Sunac decisions discussed above, insofar as the instrument creating the overriding royalty interest contained no provision extending the overriding
royalty on leases taken in renewal and extension.1 1 6 Thus, deliberation of the direct effects of the clause-whether the 1990 lease was
indeed a "new" lease or an "extension or renewal" of the 1974 leasewas not even a question for the Sasser Court. Consequently, the principle impact of the Sasser decision in applying the Sunac approach to
this issue is to extend our understanding of when a constructive trust
may be imposed to protect the overriding royalty owner under current
Texas law.
1. Further Limits the Occasions in Which a Constructive
Trust will be Found
Having previously reached the conclusion in our survey of preSasser cases that the presence of an extension or renewal clause in the
instrument creating the overriding royalty carries little weight against
countervailing language that would negate the alleged fiduciary obligation, it becomes even more clear in the light of the Sasser decision
that if the assignment creating the overriding royalty does not contain
the magic "phraseology" to impose the overriding royalty on leases
taken in renewal and extension, "it is unlikely that the specific lanterminate the original lease and enter into a new lease that would effectively eliminate
the overriding royalty owner's interest. See id. Nevertheless, production on the
leased property never abated. See id. at 920. The facts in Cain suggested that the
defending parties intentionally harmed the overriding royalty interest owner for their
own unjustifiable benefit. See id. at 919. The court held that the parties had not
terminated the original lease and that the overriding royalty interest survived. See id.
at 921.
The Sasser Court distinguished Cain on the basis that the lease involved "did not
contain a surrender clause nor a partial release clause." Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 607
(quoting Cain, 316 S.W.2d at 920). The court explained that "it [was] this contractual
right to unilaterally terminate the lease, coupled with the absence of any facts justifying the imposition of a confidential or fiduciary relationship, that conclusively defeat[ed] Sasser's duty argument." Id.
114. See Sasser, 906 S.W.2d 607. The court observed that "the method by which a
lease is terminated-so long as it is contractually permitted-is a distinction without a
difference." Id.
115. See id.
116. See id. at 606.
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guage in the assignment will ever support a 'washout' claim."1'17 As a
general rule in Texas, "when an oil and gas lease terminates, the overriding royalty created in an assignment of the lease is likewise extinguished." 1'18 The Sasser decision follows this established Texas law in
recognizing that the termination of the leasehold estate results in the
extinguishment of the overriding royalty interest, unless the instrument creating the overriding royalty interest expressly provides to the
contrary.
Finding no language in the instrument creating the overriding royalty interest which imposed a fiduciary obligation, the only basis under
Sunac for the Sasser Court to have justified the imposition of a constructive trust would have been a holding that there existed a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties. 1 9 Despite
evidence that the 1974 lease was intentionally terminated by the assignor, and despite the court's contention that the assignor's right to
do so would be effective even assuming that there was commercial
production under the existing lease, the court dismissed the notion
that any120 confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between the
parties.
2.

Extends Reach of Sunac Decision to Productive Leases

In reaching this holding, the San Antonio Court of Appeals effectively broadens the reach of the Sunac reasoning to extend to situations in which the lessee may intentionally terminate a lease-even a
commercially productive lease-and, in the process, extinguish an
override owner's interest, thereby interfering with the override's existing contractual relationship and possibly harming him economically. 12 1 For these reasons, the Sasser decision is disturbing. The
effects of the decision may have far reaching and serious implications
for the Texas oil and gas industry. As one commentator has observed:
The case is remarkable. The court in effect holds that even assuming a base lease is productive, a landowner who wants more royalty and a lessee who wants at the least, peace from a landowner's
lawsuit (if not a higher net revenue interest) are free to agree to
wash out a non-executive overriding royalty interest if no special,
confidential or fiduciary relationship is involved. . . .The lessee
should have at least the minimal duty not to intentionally interfere
with the override's existing relationship or intentionally destroy the
override interest or to intentionally harm him.... An owner [of an
overriding royalty interest] should have the right to be secure in the
117. Richard F. Brown, Annual Survey of Texas Law: Oil, Gas and Mineral Law, 49

SMU L. REV. 1177, 1185 (1996).
118. Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1967).
119. See Sasser, 906 S.W.2d at 606-07 (citing Sunac, 416 S.W.2d at 804-05).
120. See id. at 607.
121. If no production is obtained, the royalty is worthless. However, if prolific production is found, an overriding royalty may be extremely valuable.
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knowledge that its interest will not be extinguished by the agreement of the lessor and lessee or the intentional act of a lessee (who
has a financial incentive to release the old lease and take a new
lease). The effect of [the Sasser] decision-that the lessor and
lessee may agree to terminate even a productive lease and extinguish a third party interest without liability-is unsettling.... Even
if the override is held to have been extinguished, a damage remedy

should be available to an override owner whose interest, intention22
ally, was held out, at least in cases of a producing base lease.1
3. Conclusions
As we have seen, the effect of Texas Supreme Court's decisions in
Sunac and the cases following Sunac has been to significantly narrow
the scope of protection given to owners of overriding royalty interests
against lease operators seeking to extinguish these interests. The outcome of these decisions has been to reduce the effectiveness of the
extension or renewal clause as an anti-washout provision and to significantly limit those circumstances in which a Texas court will find a
confidential or fiduciary relationship and impose a constructive trust
requiring the recognition of an overriding royalty interest. Arguably,
the broadening of Sunac by the Sasser Court to extend to the lessor
and lessee the right to terminate intentionally even a productive lease
and extinguish a third party interest is unsupported by the reasoning
of Sunac itself, as well as the reasoning of post-Sunac decisions.
One commentator has noted that courts within the Tenth Circuit
are, as a matter of policy, moving to restrict the effectiveness of renewal and extension clauses in oil and gas lease assignments.12 3 These
policy initiatives are motivated by concerns that the protection of
overriding royalty interests, through extension or renewal clauses,
"would prevent operators from acquiring new leases on property covered by an existing lease with an attached overriding royalty interest
in extensions or renewals"' 24 and would create "'an irrational2 5impediment to the business of oil exploration and development.' "l
Although no such broad policy statement has been made by the
Texas courts, the argument may be made that in view of the judicial
treatment by Texas courts on this issue, the present trend of limiting
the scope of protection afforded to overriding royalty interests sweeps
more broadly than its possible justification. As one commentator has
insightfully observed: "What must be considered is that overriding
royalty owners are at the mercy of the lease operators . .

.

. [Tihe

122. Melvin W. Cockrell, Current Developments in Texas Oil and Gas Law, 38-39

(Aug. 22, 1996) (unpublished paper for Review of Oil & Gas XI, Energy Law Section
of the Dallas Bar Assoc.).
123. See Ney, supra note 22, at 544.
124. Id. at 570.
125. Id. (quoting Lillibridge v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 907 F.2d 1031, 1036 (10th Cir.
1990)).

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol5/iss2/5
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V5.I2.4

20

Fenk: Are Overriding Royalty Interests Becoming the Clay Pigeons of the

1999]

SASSER v. DANTEX OIL & GAS

position of an overriding royalty owner 'holding... an overriding royalty under a lease in the hands of an ...
precarious one.'""2 6

unscrupulous operator is a

What is needed in Texas is not a broad duty to protect all overriding
interests in all cases, but an oil and gas lessee should at the least owe
an overriding royalty interest owner a minimal duty of good faith not
to engage in intentional acts designed to eliminate or "washout" the
overriding royalty interest owner, particularly when the result is to
enhance the lessee's interest.
Edward M. Fenk

126. Id. at 571 (citation omitted).
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